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Abstract
The Civil War was a defining moment in American history. What began as a sectional debate over states’ rights
transformed itself into a bloody odyssey that would alter the national character itself. Within the wide scope of
this conflict, scholars have sought to answer the multifaceted question of how the Union triumphed, often
citing the proficient management of the railways as a key contribution to victory. Within this logistical
network of rails, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad served as a vital mode of transportation for supplies and
troop mobility through the heartland states of Kentucky and Tennessee. The Union exploited this advantage,
thus making the Louisville & Nashville Railroad a case study in the field of Military History of successful:
defensive strategy, offensive strategy, tactical efficiency and establishment of secure logistical lines. Doing so
helped them secure the strategically important border state of Kentucky, which in turn became a launching
pad into Tennessee and ultimately, the Deep South itself. Hence, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad
significantly helped the Union win the Civil War.
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A DAGGER THROUGH THE HEARTLAND: THE 
LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD IN THE 
CIVIL WAR 
 
Gared N. Dalton 
 
Historians have long debated whether the Civil War 
was an old-fashioned or modern war, and with both sides 
offering convincing evidence, it makes this historiographical 
issue both arcane and, in some instances, irrelevant. But 
when the issues include the use of railroads by the Union 
military, one can only be left with the impression that if the 
Civil War was not a modern one in all aspects, it certainly 
was in the aspect of the North’s skillful implementation of 
railways to overcome their strategic disadvantage of fighting 
a war by means of exterior lines.1 One of the best examples 
of the Union’s innovative use of an existing railroad was its 
efficient and highly effective control of the Louisville and 
Nashville (L&N) railroad in Kentucky and Tennessee for 
most of the war.  
The North’s control of the L&N reflected a profound 
understanding by its military leaders for synchronizing 
already existing railroads into a matrix for the transportation 
of troops, supplies, wounded soldiers, and rapid deployment 
                                                 
1 Gary Gallagher, Introduction, Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic 
Place of Railroads in the Civil War, ed. George Turner (Lincoln, NE: 
Bison Books, 1953).  
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in response to the ever-changing battlespace.2 In 
comparison, the South’s railway system was in utter 
disarray, plagued with railways unlinked with others and 
incompatible rail gauges, all of which created a logistical 
nightmare.3 Within this logistical network of rails and 
spikes, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad served as a 
vital vein into the heartland of the Confederacy to be 
exploited by the Union. Thus, it ensured a Northern victory 
over its Southern aggressor by becoming a dagger that drove 
straight into the Confederate heartland. This allowed the 
Union to establish a reliable line of communication as well 
as transport men and war materials directly toward the 
heartland front, spanning from western Kentucky to eastern 
Tennessee, and, later in the war, it played a key role in the 
Chattanooga and Atlanta campaigns.4 Running between the 
title cities of Louisville, Kentucky, and Nashville, 
Tennessee, the L&N benefited the Union by providing a 
logistical route in a geographic area that lacked navigable 
rivers.5 Furthermore, the L&N was easily put into use by the 
Union because they were the same gauge as the Northern 
standard.6  
                                                 
2 William Thomas, The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the 
Making of Modern America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 
149. 
3 Steven Woodworth, This Great Struggle: America’s Civil War 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2012), 223-224. 
4 John Clark, Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of Management on 
Victory and Defeat (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2001), 34. 
5  R. S. Cotterill, “The Louisville and Nashville Railroad 1861-1865”, 
American Historical Review 29 no. 4 (July 1924), 700. 
6 Clark, Railroads in the Civil War, 150-151. 
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 At the outbreak of the war, the L&N became a 
contentious vital resource, eyed by both the Union and 
Confederacy for its military potential. The Commonwealth 
of Kentucky, however, decided to declare neutrality in the 
war and remain in the Union. That neutrality ended when the 
Confederate forces invaded the state, prompting the Union 
command to send troops into the Northwestern portion of 
Kentucky. In autumn of 1861, the Confederates established 
a long and fragile battle line that extended from a left flank 
of Columbus to a right flank near Mill Springs, supported by 
a bastion in the center, Bowling Green, which they quickly 
began to fortify in anticipation of a Union response.7 For a 
short time, the L&N was partially in the hands of both sides.8 
Breaking this line, the Union first attacked (and defeated) the 
Confederates at Mill Springs in January of 1862, obliterating 
their right flank. Then, a month later, General Grant 
eradicated the Confederate left flank by attacking Corinth 
and subsequently securing Forts Henry and Donelson in 
Northwestern Tennessee.9 With the successful attacks on the 
Confederate flanks, the Union forces then positioned 
themselves to secure the bastion of the Confederate line, 
Bowling Green.  
                                                 
7 George Turner, Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the 
Railroads in the Civil War, (Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison Books, 1953), 
100-101. 
8 Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company Yearly Report, June 30, 
1862, in Joseph Kerr, Historical Development of the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad System, January 1926, Kentucky Museum Archives, 
Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, Kentucky, 20. 
9 Woodworth, This Great Struggle, 89. 
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 Continuing the Union momentum, General Buell 
implemented the L&N to maneuver his troops toward 
Bowling Green in hopes of breaking the crumbling 
Confederate grip upon Kentucky.10 Recognizing the 
inevitable, Confederate General Johnston retreated from 
Bowling Green and took up a new position at a rail hub in 
Corinth, Tennessee. With General Buell subsequently 
occupying Bowling Green, Kentucky and Gallatin, 
Tennessee, the Confederate hold on Kentucky was lost. 
When Nashville fell to Union forces on February 25th, every 
mile of the L&N belonged to the Union military, which 
meant the North now held a major transportation and 
industrial center they could use to strike deeper into the 
Confederacy.11  
 While occupying Nashville, the army under the 
command of General Buell also became “wholly dependent” 
upon the L&N for supplies.12 Every bullet, black powder 
canister, food ration and medicinal instrument for the entire 
Army of the Ohio could now be expediently transported on 
the L&N. Even the letters from soldiers, the only connection 
that could soften the hard life as a soldier, could ride from 
Nashville to Louisville and find their way to their Northern 
recipient.13 Because of the Union victories in Kentucky and 
                                                 
10 Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, 116. 
11 Ibid., 125. 
12 General Buell, December 18, 1862 in the U.S. War Department, The 
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies, series 1 vol. 16, 158. Hereafter cited as O.R. 
All references are to Series 1.   
13 Gerald Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in 
the American Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1987), 94. 
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Tennessee, the L&N was a reliable logistical source for their 
forces. However, as General Buell would discover, there 
were risks involved when relying upon one logistical 
resource. 
 The Confederacy, however, decided it had 
surrendered too much ground and chose to counter the Union 
advances by launching their Heartland Offensive in mid-
1862. Doing so would demonstrate how vital the L&N truly 
was for Union as it had become the sturdy backbone that 
helped halt the Confederate campaign. As the Union was 
securing its grip upon the L&N railway,  
Confederate forces employed Colonel John Hunt Morgan 
and his raiders to sabotage the Union’s vital supply line. One 
of the earliest attacks upon the L&N occurred in May of 
1862, when Morgan’s raiders attempted to free Confederate 
prisoners of war aboard a northbound train near Cave City, 
Kentucky. Not being able to obtain their goal, the raiders 
sufficed their expedition by capturing a passenger train and 
successfully burning forty-five freight cars and blowing up 
the locomotive.14  
Tirelessly, the Confederacy persisted in its attempts 
to wreak havoc along the L&N, hoping for enough success 
to render the railroad virtually unusable as a secure resource, 
but Union authorities were determined to keep trains running 
along the L&N. In a report to President Lincoln alerting him 
of Morgan’s entrance into Kentucky, Tennessee’s Military 
Governor Andrew Johnson concluded that the Louisville-
                                                 
14 Report of H.W. Stager, telegraph operator, May 11, 1862 in O.R. 
10:891.  
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Nashville railway was the main target of these raids and 
“should be protected by all means.”15 For the remainder of 
1862, the L&N would serve as both a vital asset to the Union 
to counter the Confederate Offensive and as a strategic target 
for the Confederacy.  
 But this was no simple task for Union generals. 
Between July 1861 and June 1862, damages caused by 
Confederate raids resulted in a total of sixteen locomotives 
lost or damaged, 142 box cars destroyed, and a multitude of 
flatbeds, coal cars, and passenger cars put out of 
commission.16 In 1862, Morgan continued to plague the 
L&N with attacks along the line. His successful raids served 
as a template for future raids, but were most effective in this 
time frame due to the less than adequate defenses of the 
railroad. In August of 1862, he attacked Gallatin, Tennessee 
and disrupted communications between Louisville and 
Nashville by destroying a bridge and a locomotive attached 
to numerous cars.17 His raiders also made rail tunnels around 
Gallatin nearly impassible, hoping to cripple Buell’s supply 
line for weeks, if not months.18 Doing so would, they hoped, 
stall the Union advance through Tennessee and force the 
Union army to address their supply lines. A few days later, 
after Union troops repaired the railway, Morgan’s men then 
cut the telegraph wires, alienating General Buell’s army in 
                                                 
15 Andrew Johnson to Abraham Lincoln, July 10, 1862, in O.R. 16:188.  
16 Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company Yearly Report, June 30, 
1862, in Kerr, Historical Development, 24.  
17 Ibid., 27. 
18 Robert Mackey, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper 
South, 1861-1865 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 
136. 
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Nashville with no means of communicating with other 
Union armies in the field or with the War Department in 
Washington.19  
The continual assaults upon the railway showed 
Morgan’s ingenious tactical technique: by implementing his 
cavalry in swift raids and striking at various locations 
without warning, he baffled the Union commanders, leaving 
them to question how they could defend their strategic 
railroad. Capture was merely an appealing, yet allusive, idea, 
and the cavalry that would be required to adequately chase 
and destroy Morgan’s’ force was unavailable. To deter 
attacks, General Buell scattered small detachments of troops 
along the railroad.20 Enough to deter Morgan from striking 
defended locations, his forces focused instead on weakly 
held, or undefended, sections of the railroad. But the Union, 
heavily reliant upon the L&N, would be forced to repair 
whatever damages Morgan’s forces inflicted. In September 
1862, when Confederate General Bragg launched an 
invasion into Kentucky—coordinated to coincide with 
General Lee’s invasion into Maryland—Morgan again 
destroyed sections of the railroad to hinder Buell’s approach 
to counter Bragg.21  
 Meanwhile, the Confederate Heartland Offensive 
was straining the Union’s defensive lines. Needing to 
counter the offensive, or to simply halt its advance, the 
Union authorities in Kentucky stationed troops along the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 28. 
20 Ibid., 133. 
21 L&N Yearly Report, June 30, 1863 in Kerr, Historical Development, 
30. 
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entirety of the L&N, forming a battle-line to oppose the 
Confederates. Doing so was tactically sound because not 
only did the L&N need to be defended, but it could then be 
used to aid any Union advance from anywhere its tracks laid. 
The Union could have easily maneuvered soldiers from any 
area along the rail to either counter the Confederate 
offensive or launch a counter attack.  
Fearing a decisive attack, Major-General Halleck, 
General-in-Chief of the Union armies, sent reinforcements 
from Indiana and Illinois to the battle-line through 
Louisville, using the L&N to hasten their journey.22 
Analyzing the Union’s defenses of the L&N, prior to the 
reinforcements, Captain C.C. Gilbert reported his 
unfavorable opinion to General Buell. In his estimation, the 
detachments of ten or twelve men were too scarce and too 
small, and the entirety of defenses inadequate due to the less 
than satisfactory earthworks. Lastly, he noted that no 
defenses existed between Munfordville and Louisville at that 
time.23 He rightly shared his worries because one intent of 
the Heartland Campaign was an all-out assault by 
Confederate forces aimed to repulse the Union forces and 
secure portions of the L&N.  
In September 1862, Confederate General George 
Williamson, acting under General Polk, ordered an attack on 
Proctor’s Station and Cave City, Kentucky in order to secure 
and hold those stations.24 If successful, the attack would cut 
                                                 
22 Horatio Wright to Henry W. Halleck, August 29, 1862 in O.R. 16:447.  
23 C.C. Gilbert to Buell, August 9, 1862, in O.R. 16:299.   
24 Special Orders No. 17, September 12, 1862, in O.R. 16:817.  
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the Union hold on the L&N and would leave all of the 
Federal forces south of Cave City alienated from their main 
supply and communication lines, not to mention vulnerable 
to being surrounded. The choice of location was a sound 
tactical move because the stretch of rail from Lebanon 
Junction to Bowling Green made a salient bowed to the 
south, with Cave City at the peak, thus making it more 
susceptible to attack. To support this assault, Confederate 
Colonel John Pegram ordered cavalry under the command of 
Colonel John Scott to destroy the L&N to halt Buell’s 
approach.25 Despite their best efforts to hinder either the 
Union’s use of the L&N or their strategic hold on Kentucky, 
the Confederate forces did not succeed in either endeavor. 
Following the battle of Perryville on October 8th, the 
Confederate leadership decided to cut their losses of their 
flailing invasion and subsequently retreated.  Both the Union 
and the L&N earned credit for holding the strategic border 
state of Kentucky. Without the L&N’s backbone support of 
the Union lines, the North’s ability to defend Kentucky 
would have been greatly reduced, possibly even rendering 
them incapable of doing so. Thus, the L&N was a vital part 
of the Union’s repulsion of the Confederate Heartland 
Campaign.  
In November of 1862, with the Union having secured 
and repaired the entirety of the L&N’s railway, the blue-clad 
soldiers of the North stood poised to thrust a dagger into the 
                                                 
25 John Pegram to John Scott, September 4, 1862 in O.R. 16:796.  
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Confederate heartland.26 But the South, eager to thwart any 
Union advance southward, launched a surprise attack upon 
the L&N by dispatching Morgan to attack the trestles at 
Muldraugh’s Hill, Kentucky.27  He successfully reached his 
target on December 28, 1862, by leveraging his cavalry’s 
speed and agility to move northward all while delaying 
Union forces with flank skirmishes. After pummeling the 
garrison with artillery and forcing the Union troops to 
surrender, his raiders burned the two trestle bridges of the 
L&N. Immediately after achieving his goal, Morgan’s force 
retreated, in order to avoid entrapment, to Confederate lines 
in Tennessee on January 2nd, 1863.28 Just like before, the 
Federal troops called upon their engineer corps to make 
rapid repairs to the railway to mitigate the damage dealt to 
the L&N, so it could continue to be implemented as a vital 
logistical tool as they advance southward.  
Thus, when 1863 dawned, Union leaders were 
preparing a dual offensive to capture Chattanooga and 
Knoxville, hoping to secure Tennessee and push the Union 
battle lines deeper into the Confederate heartland, to a point 
where they were virtually knocking on the door of the Deep 
South.29 Still hoping to cripple or stall the Union advance, 
the South was preparing their updated raiding strategy for 
the upcoming year.  But the Union had learned from the raids 
of 1862 and improved their defenses, including the L&N, by 
                                                 
26 L&N Yearly Report, June 30, 1863 in Kerr, Historical Development, 
32. 
27 Mackey, The Uncivil War, 143. 
28 Ibid., 144. 
29 Ibid., 165. 
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upgrading the blockhouse system already in place with 
embanked walls around the blockhouses and by positioning 
artillery near the railroad.30  It appeared that the worries in 
Captain Gilbert’s unfavorable report were no longer a 
concern.  
With the L&N secured, but still under threat of 
Confederate raids, the Union pushed deeper into Southern 
territory. The L&N continued to provide vital service to the 
Union armies in the Western Theatre as a major supply line 
but also now to the troops of General Rosecrans.31 However, 
beyond serving as a vital vein for supplies and 
communication, the L&N by autumn of 1862 was routinely 
used to transport injured soldiers to rear-ward medical 
facilities in Louisville and Nashville.32 The railroad 
facilitated the transport of thousands of soldiers to larger 
facilities that were better equipped to serve their needs, 
improving the chance of survival. If anything, it could have 
been a needed morale boost to the wounded soldier to 
disengage from the conflict and be in more constant contact 
with friends and family. This system impressed General 
Thomas so much that he actually required the hospital trains 
to be equipped with the best crews and locomotive engines 
available.33 
In late 1863, the L&N was still a vital tool, as it aided 
the Union in ousting the Confederates from Kentucky. Later 
that year, the L&N best displayed its efficiency with the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 168. 
31 Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, 249. 
32 Ibid., 302. 
33 Ibid., 303. 
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dramatic movement of General Hooker’s Eleventh and 
Twelfth Corps to aid in the capture of Chattanooga, TN. 
With Rosecrans’s defeat at Chickamauga, Assistant 
Secretary of War Charles Dana requested over twenty 
thousand troops to be hurried to Eastern Tennessee to not 
only assist Rosecrans, whose army was under siege in 
Chattanooga, but also to set the stage for upcoming 
operations into Georgia.34 In response, Secretary of War 
Stanton boasted that 30,000 Union troops from the Army of 
the Potomac in the east could be taxied via rail to 
Chattanooga in five days. The planned route would ship the 
soldiers from Washington, D.C on the B&O railroad to 
Baltimore, where they would pick up the main B&O track to 
the Ohio River and be ferried across. Once across the river, 
they subsequently marched from Columbus to Indianapolis 
and then southward to cross the Ohio River into Louisville, 
KY. Once in Louisville, they then would ride the L&N to 
Nashville and be loaded unto the Nashville-Chattanooga 
railway to complete their journey.35 After departing on 
September 26th, and following some delays in Indianapolis, 
the two corps arrived in Chattanooga fourteen days later.36 
To appreciate the sheer scale of maneuverability the L&N 
contributed to this scheme, one need only to consider the fact 
that the railroad moved 25,000 troops, accompanied by ten 
artillery batteries and one hundred cars of baggage a distance 
                                                 
34 Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War 1861-1865 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 181. 
35 Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, 289. 
36 Weber, Northern Railroads, 186. 
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of approximately 1,200 miles in two weeks.37 This logistical 
feat truly demonstrated not only the Union’s mastery of the 
rail system, but also how interconnected it was, allowing 
specific lines like the L&N to become important resources 
in strategic planning and implementation. Thus, Rosecrans 
was reinforced and the Union lines held in Tennessee, 
despite the dire siege that poised to become a Confederate 
victory.  
However, the Confederacy had not forgotten the 
importance of the L&N to the Union cause. Once more, they 
sent Morgan, the proven cavalry raider, with orders to attack 
the three hundred-man garrison holding Louisville.38 This 
summer raid was designed to serve not only as a disruption 
of Union supply lines and a distraction for Union cavalry but 
also as a recruitment devise aimed at encouraging 
sympathetic Kentuckians to join the Confederate cause.39 
But Morgan, disregarding his orders, set his focus on an 
assault in Indiana and Ohio rather than attacking the garrison 
in Louisville.40 Morgan and his raiders attacked the L&N at 
Lebanon Junction, which Morgan’s raiders captured before 
promptly departing across the Ohio River to continue their 
raid northward. But this time, success eluded Morgan and 
his raiders. After being defeated on July 19, the raiders were 
now fleeing Union territory. Morgan’s “Great Raid,” as it 
came to be called, concluded when his force was 
unsurprisingly surrounded by Union forces in Ohio, 
                                                 
37 Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, 293. 
38 Mackey, Uncivil War, 178. 
39 Ibid., 178. 
40 Ibid., 177. 
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surrendering, thus closing his chapter of terror upon the 
railway.41  
 The mastery of railways by the Union military during 
the American Civil War truly contributed to their victory 
over the Confederacy. Within this network of Union-
controlled railways, the Louisville & Nashville played a 
significant role in aiding the Federal armies’ invasion into 
the Deep South while still keeping a reliable flow of men and 
supplies to wherever the North needed them. Without the 
L&N, Union armies of the Western Theatre would have 
fought a treacherous campaign without sufficient supplies or 
means of adequate transportation for their wounded. In these 
respects, the L&N became a dagger in the hands of the 
Federal armies who benefited from the railroad’s 
geographical location, efficient and reliable transportation, 
and long reach from Louisville to the vital river and rail hub 
of Nashville. By any measure, the L&N stands as an example 
of how the Union military fought a modern war in which 
steel rails meant the difference between victory and defeat.   
  
                                                 
41 Ibid., 194. 
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